We investigate equity market reactions to the announcement of impairments of retained interests arising from asset securitizations made by financial institutions during the Financial Crisis of [2007][2008]. We hypothesize that retained interests contain information about the implicit guarantee that financial institutions provide in securitization transactions and analyze announcement effects of impairments of retained interests on trading volume, stock price bid-ask spreads, stock returns, and equity volatility implied in option prices. Although retained interest impairments are relatively small in magnitude, compared to these other writedowns, our hypothesis suggests that they reveal information that of exposure to a much larger loss associated with off-balance sheet assets and liabilities. We use the market reaction to the announcements of loan losses and writedowns of asset-backed securities purchased as investments as a benchmark to compare the market reaction to the retained interest writedowns. We find evidence that each of the announcements has information content as indicated by an increase in trading volume. The increase in trading volume is also accompanied by a predicted increase in bid-ask spreads; the increase is greatest for announcements of retained interest writedowns, which is consistent with the market being concerned that insiders have information about honoring the implicit guarantees associated with assets retained from securitizations that could expose banks to the risk of substantial future losses. None of the announcements has a significant effect on stock returns. We also predict and find that implied equity volatility increases with retained interest writedown announcements, which is consistent with such announcements increasing investor uncertainty. In contrast, consistent with loan losses reducing investor uncertainty, we predict and find the large loan loss announcements are associated with a decrease in implied volatility. Findings from additional tests that focus on bid-ask spreads indicate that information asymmetry regarding the cash flow risk associated with retained interest writedowns is greater for unregulated financial institutions and for the financial institutions that are less capital constrained. These findings are consistent with information asymmetry effects being lower when substantial costs limit a financial institution from absorbing losses incurred by SPEs.
1.

Introduction
In this study, we investigate equity market reactions to the announcement of impairments of retained interests arising from asset securitizations made by financial institutions during the Financial Crisis of [2007] [2008] . 1 In the past two decades, asset securitizations were used extensively by financial institutions as an indirect means of borrowing from capital providers beyond the traditional sources (demand deposits and unsecured debt). Typical securitizations involved the transfer by a sponsor-originator (S-O) of financial assets, including mortgages and receivables, to a special purpose entity (SPE) that issued debt securities to finance the acquisition of the transferred assets. Securitizations provided benefits to financial institutions by enabling them to diversify their asset holdings, by extending their capital base to wholesale money market funds, and by enabling them to arbitrage regulatory capital rules, as banks keep debt off-balance sheet that otherwise would be on-balance sheet, thereby reducing regulatory capital.
A common feature of securitizations is that the S-O retains an interest in the transferred assets by holding the most junior asset-backed securities issued by the SPE, i.e., "retained interests." Retained interests help keep the cost of borrowing low for the SPE (and implicitly, the S-O), by having the S-O absorb first loss. However, the direct benefit of lowering borrowing costs is likely to be small because financial institutions cannot retain a large stake in SPE assets as this would reduce or eliminate the benefits of securitization. In addition, accounting rules that applied during the Financial Crisis prohibited S-Os from offering explicit contractual guarantees regarding the performance of transferred assets to SPE creditors if the transactions were to be accounted for as a sale, resulting in derecognition of the transferred assets. Thus, S-Os had to find a means to provide non-contractual guarantees to SPE investors to obtain beneficially lower borrowing costs. To be credible, an implicit guarantee must be costly to the S-O. For repeated players in the securitization markets this primarily took the form of a reputational stake that depended on honoring the implicit understanding to cover SPE losses. The extent of the implicit guarantee has to be greater the more risky are the SPE assets, all else equal. Because retained interest empirically exists typically only for SPEs with risky assets and because retained interest is observable to parties outside the S-O and SPE creditors, we hypothesize that the existence of retained interest is a useful proxy for the existence of implicit guarantee provided by the S-O.
Note that if retained interest fully covered most potential losses of SPE investors, then it would be unnecessary for the S-O to offer any implicit guarantees. However, because retained interest is costly to the S-O, it cannot be large enough to cover all possible losses, especially in times of market stress, and thus must be accompanied by an implicit guarantee.
An implication of the hypothesis that the presence of retained interest is correlated with implicit guarantees regarding the performance of SPE assets is that an observable loss in value of retained interest will also be accompanied by an increase in the probability that the implicit call option held by SPE creditors associated with implicit guarantees will be in the money. Such losses in value of retained interest are not likely to occur during periods of rising asset prices, but rather when asset prices fall, as was the case during the Financial Crisis. Although prior research provides evidence that the stock market values bank equities as if managed SPE debt is economically S-O debt, given the relatively benign economic conditions that characterize the sample periods in prior research, it is likely that any SPE asset shortfalls would have been covered by the retained interests, with no need to call upon the implicit guarantees provided by the S-Os.
The question we address is whether writedowns of retained interests by S-O banks during the Financial Crisis resulted in market participants taking actions reflecting their belief that the S-O banks would honor some implicit guarantees. We investigate this by examining the market reaction to the retained interest writedown announcements in 8-K disclosures made by the largest 100 financial institutions in the U.S. during the period October 1, 2007 to December 31, 2008. We use the market reaction to the 8-K announcements of loan losses, and writedowns of asset-backed securities (ABS) purchased as investments as a benchmark to compare the market reaction to the retained interest writedowns. Although retained interest impairments are relatively small in magnitude, compared to these other writedowns, our hypothesis suggests that they reveal information that of exposure to a much larger loss associated with off-balance sheet assets and liabilities. If disclosure of the impairments of any of the three types of assets is newsworthy to investors, i.e., information is released via the 8-K, we expect there to be an increase in trading volume. Based on prior literature, we predict that all three types of impairments have information content, and hence abnormal trading volume will increase, but make no distinction among them concerning magnitude. We find a positive and significant relationship between each of the impairment types and abnormal trading volume with retained interest having the largest coefficient across the impairment types.
Conditional on there being an observed increase in trading volume for each type of impairment, we expect the market makers in S-O stocks will price protect themselves and widen the bid-ask spread as they are concerned that insiders with private information may take advantage of the situation because they can more easily hide their transactions (Copeland and Galai, 1983; Krinsky and Lee, 1996) . Furthermore, we predict that the effect on the bid-ask spread will be largest for the retained interest writedowns as market makers will be concerned that the insiders (including bank managers) are trading to take advantage of the information they have about actions the S-O will take regarding whether and the extent to which the institution will absorb the losses of its SPEs. In contrast, the market maker has less cause to worry that the increase in trading volume for the other two impairment types reflects trades by insiders with private information because these events are unlikely to have implications for future cash flows beyond that implied by the announcement itself. Consistent with our predictions, we find that all three types of impairments lead to an increase in the bid-ask spread, with the increase being greatest for retained interest impairments.
Although an increase in trading volume does not necessarily imply there will be a directional price effect on bank stock prices, an increase in bid-ask spreads generally does. In particular, other things being equal, an increase in spreads suggests stock prices should fall when an impairment is announced as the increase in spread implies an increase in the cost of capital.
However, other things may not be equal-in particular, there may also be a change in investor expectations regarding future cash flows as well as a change in risk. Although we predict negative price reactions for impairments-particularly retained interest impairments-the possibility remains that the difficulty in capturing changes in investor expectations makes return predictions problematic. Contrary to predictions, results indicate no significant effect on stock return from any of the impairment announcements, including retained interests.
Finally, we consider stock price volatility implied in call option prices. Prior research indicates that if a firm announcement can be anticipated, e.g., as is the case in most earnings announcements, implied equity volatility decreases following the announcement, as investor uncertainty is resolved. Because the 8-K disclosures in our sample typically involve earnings announcements, implied volatility should increase before each impairment announcement then fall on the day of the announcement, if uncertainty is resolved. However, because retained interest impairments can create rather than resolve investor uncertainty about what actions management will take regarding honoring implicit guarantees granted to SPE creditors, we predict implied volatility to increase when retained interest writedowns are announced. Findings support this prediction. In contrast, loan impairment announcements lead to a drop in implied volatility and therefore suggest such announcements result in a resolution of investor uncertainty.
Findings from additional tests that focus on bid-ask spreads indicate that information asymmetry regarding the cash flow risk associated with retained interest writedowns is greater for unregulated financial institutions and for the financial institutions that are less capital constrained. These findings are consistent with information asymmetry effects being lower when substantial costs limit a financial institution from absorbing losses incurred by SPEs.
Our study makes several contributions to the literature. First, we provide evidence that is consistent with the existence and implications of implicit guarantees in securitization transactions. Second, our analysis on spreads focusing on the effects of regulation and capital constraints provides evidence on the costs that limit the ability of S-Os to honor implicit guarantees. Third, our evidence suggests that frictions caused by regulation and accounting standards, including SFAS 140, created alternative mechanisms for securitization contracting i.e., implicit guarantees. Fourth, our findings complement those from prior research that the market views SPE assets and liabilities as assets and liabilities of the S-O. However, by focusing on the Financial Crisis, our analysis is done in a setting that is potentially more revealing of the underlying economics of the securitization transaction than is the case in prior research. Finally, the evidence we present also suggests that disclosure of securitization transactions in the S-O's financial statements is limited and therefore adds to investor uncertainty and information asymmetry.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides background of the role of securitizations in the Financial Crisis and motivation for our predictions. Section 3 discusses our predictions and section 4 presents our empirical tests. Section 5 describes our data and sample. Section 6 presents the findings, and section 7 presents a summary and concluding remarks.
Background and Motivation
At the heart of the credit crisis of 2007-2008 is asset securitization, a Wall Street innovation that has become a large source of corporate financing over the last two decades. By the end of 2007, the outstanding securitization market was valued at $9.3 trillion, making it over twice the size of U.S. treasuries, which were valued at $4.5 trillion (Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association 2008) . Asset securitizations enable a firm to obtain cash for assets transferred to another entity. 2 In a typical securitization, the S-O sets up an SPE, which borrows funds from third parties to purchase the securitized assets from the S-O, using the assets as collateral. A common feature of securitizations is that the S-O retains an interest in the most junior asset-backed securities issued by the SPE. Such securities are commonly referred to as "retained interests." Another common feature is for the S-O to continue to service the portfolio of loans transferred to the SPE-charging the SPE for this service-because the SPE is typically no more than a passive trust.
Securitizations became a major source of bank financing for three reasons. First, securitization is a significant mechanism for banks to access the wholesale money markets, These benefits for S-O banks are more likely to be obtained if the investors to whom the asset-backed securities are sold can be convinced that the underlying assets are shielded from the general financial risk (i.e., other creditors) of the S-O. A key method to achieve this goal is to place the underlying assets in an SPE structured in such a way as to signal to SPE investors that the value of their claims are independent of the bankruptcy risk of the sponsor (Landsman, Peasnell, and Shakespeare, 2008) . Thus, securitization is a vehicle that helps to guarantee SPE investors priority of claims over the securitized assets.
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However, what the SPE investors lose by this investment vehicle is claim to the assets of the S-O. As a result, other things equal, the cost associated with the failure of the SPE assets to perform is borne entirely by the SPE investors. This cost is ex ante higher the lower is the quality of the assets that have been transferred to the SPE. 5 The cost is ex ante lower the higher 3 Bleck and Gao (2010) provide several reasons for why retaining loans on the balance sheet is costly to regulated and unregulated financial institutions. Among the costs are capital requirements, deposit insurance premia, lack of portfolio diversification, the advantage financial institutions have to originate loans relative to their ability to manage them, and financial constraints. 4 Another player that can affect the effectiveness of protecting the SPE creditors' claims to the assets of the SPE is the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). In December 2009, the FDIC proposed new safe harbor rules that would affect whether S-O's creditors can gain access to the SPE assets in the event of the S-O's bankruptcy. See "FDIC Seeks to Toughen Rules on Banks' Securitizations," Jody Shenn and Theo Francis, Bloomberg, December 15, 2009. 5 Pricing the SPE debt securities can be particularly problematic if it is difficult to assess the riskiness of the underlying assets. Although, in principle, SPE investors could assess the risk of assets securing their claims through is the proportion of capital provided to the SPE in the form of equity. That is, non-performance will affect equity holders before debt holders. Banks can, therefore, reduce implicit borrowing costs by retaining an equity-like stake in the SPE. Such a stake is typically referred to as 'retained interest,' which as described above is the tranche of debt securities issued by the SPE with lowest priority.
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Although retained interest helps keep borrowing costs lower by having the S-O absorb first loss, this is the primary direct contractual benefit to the SPE investors. Other things equal, the greater is the amount of retained interest, the lower is the interest rate required by SPE creditors (Leland and Pyle, 1977 to include the SPE's assets and liabilities on its balance sheet, which would negate most of the benefits from securitization. In particular, including the SPE's assets and liabilities on the S-O's balance sheet would likely result in the loss of priority protection in bankruptcy for the SPE creditors (Landsman, Peasnell, and Shakespeare, 2008) , and the elimination of regulatory capital arbitrage.
Thus, S-Os have to find an indirect but convincing method of providing a non-contractual guarantee that effectively gives the SPE creditors access to the S-O's assets in the event of nonperformance of SPE assets. One mechanism is for the S-O not to retain an interest but to offer an implicit guarantee. To be credible, such an implicit guarantee must be costly to the S-O. For repeated players in the securitization markets this will primarily take the form of a reputational stake that would be destroyed if they failed to honor the understanding they would cover SPE creditor losses. An example of this form of an implicit guarantee is revolving loan securitizations that typically involve little or no retained interest (Gorton and Souleles, 2006; Chen, Liu, and Ryan, 2008) . A more typical arrangement is for the S-O to retain interest in the SPE assets at a level that is not sufficient to provide a buffer for all expected SPE losses and therefore has to be accompanied by the unobservable implicit, reputation-based guarantees. The extent of the implicit guarantee has to be greater the more risky are the SPE assets. Because retained interest empirically exists typically only for SPEs with risky assets (Chen, Liu, and Ryan, 2008) and because retained interest is observable to parties outside the S-O and SPE creditors, we hypothesize that the existence of a retained interest is a useful proxy for the existence of an implicit guarantee provided by the S-O. Note that if retained interest fully covered most potential losses of SPE investors, then it would be unnecessary for the S-O to offer any implicit guarantees. However, because retained interest is costly to the S-O, it cannot be large enough to cover all possible losses, especially in times of market stress, and thus must be accompanied by an implicit guarantee.
An implication of the hypothesis that retained interest is correlated with implicit guarantees regarding the performance of SPE assets ( which gives the SPE creditors access to the S-O's assets to buffer their losses) is that an observable loss in value of retained interest will also be accompanied by an increase in the probability that the implicit call option held by the SPE creditors associated with implicit guarantees will be in the money. Such losses in value of retained interest do not occur when SPE assets perform, i.e., during periods of rising asset prices.
Rather, they occur when asset prices fall, as was the case during the Financial Crisis. Although Nui and Richardson (2006) and Landsman, Peasnell, and Shakespeare (2008) provide evidence that the stock market values bank equities as if managed SPE debt is economically S-O debt, neither study addresses explicitly the value of the implicit guarantee. Given the relatively benign economic conditions that characterize the sample periods in those studies, it is likely that any SPE asset shortfalls would have been covered by the retained interests, with no need to call upon the implicit guarantees provided by the S-Os, i.e., the option values associated with the implicit guarantees were out of the money. If retained interest writedowns were news to investors and caused investors to update their beliefs we would expect an increase in trading volume at the announcement date (Beaver, 1968) . However, investors could potentially use other sources of information to anticipate retained interest writedowns and other impairments using the information in other banks'
announcements or debt indices which will result in little or no incremental trading volume. In addition, the information in the announcement could be ambiguous and create little trading volume.
Whereas investors and market makers generally cannot determine whether and to what extent the implicit guarantees associated with SPE assets would be fully honored by the S-O banks, bank managers and informed traders are in a position to know what actions the bank will take. In other words, there is an information asymmetry between informed traders and investors or the market maker regarding the exact weight to attach to a retained interest writedown. 9 In contrast, writedowns of other bank assets, principally on-balance sheet loans and asset-backed 9 Adding to the information asymmetry is that investors could not easily assess the value of SPE assets because there were no required disclosures beyond those provided in the initial offer documentation. The problem was exacerbated in that SPE assets often comprised re-securitizations, whereby an SPE's asset backed securities (ABS) were often bundled with other ABSs (including those issued by other S-Os) and sold to yet another special purpose entity that finances the purchase of the bundle of securities by issuing new ABSs usually referred to as collateralized debt obligations or CDOs. Indeed, the process was often repeated again, by selling different CDOs in a further round of securitizations to create so-called "CDO 2 " securities. See Markowitz (2009) for further discussion.
securities held for trading purposes, are unlikely to pose major interpretive problems for investors or the market maker. That is, losses in value of these assets are not associated with offbalance sheet exposure to losses in value of SPE assets.
If retained interest writedowns were news to investors and they were convinced the banks would, as a result, now absorb a substantial portion of the off-balance sheet losses suffered by their SPE creditors, then we would expect bank stock prices to fall. In particular, if the retained writedown indicated that the S-O would absorb all the SPE asset losses with probability one, then the fall in stock price would reflect an estimate of the cash outflow from the S-O to the SPE creditors. However, a retained interest writedown does not necessary imply that the S-O will fully honor its implicit obligations, particularly if the losses are large enough to affect regulatory capital or the probability of bankruptcy. The bank could be in position whereby it would have to weigh the tradeoff between the cost associated with loss of reputation and the cost associated with avoiding bankruptcy or regulatory intervention (in the extreme, being taken over by the FDIC).
Uncertainty regarding whether S-O banks will honor their implicit guarantees could be significant enough to effect investors' perception about the future volatility of the banks' share prices. Unlike loan losses and CDO impairments that provide information to investors about the value of the bank on balance sheet assets, retained interest impairments may increase investors' uncertainty about the value of the S-O's future cash flows.
Predictions
To investigate whether retained interest writedowns during the Financial Crisis affected investors' perceptions of the probability that banks would honor implicit guarantees to SPE creditors, we examine various metrics of bank equity reaction. We do this by gathering a sample of retained interest writedowns and comparing market reactions associated with such writedowns to those associated with bank loan loss provisions and writedowns of asset backed securities banks held for trading purposes. These comparisons permit us to exploit differences in expected market reactions reflecting differences in the information impairment of each type of asset conveys.
For our sample of large financial institutions, we examine their 8-K filings during the Financial Crisis for disclosures related to writedowns of retained interests, writedowns of CDOs,
i.e., purchased securities issued by SPEs, and disclosures of "large" loan losses, defined as an increase in the loan loss provision that is higher than the amount announced in the previous quarter. Although retained interest impairments are relatively small in magnitude, compared to these other writedowns, our hypothesis suggests that they reveal information that of exposure to a much larger loss associated with off-balance sheet assets and liabilities. If disclosure of any of the impairments, i.e., the retained interest writedowns, CDO writedowns, or loan loss provisions, is newsworthy to investors, i.e., information is released via the 8-K, we expect there to be an increase in trading volume. Prior literature on earnings announcements indicates generally a significant increase in abnormal trading volume during the announcement period (Beaver, 1968; Bamber, Barron and Stober, 1997; Landsman and Maydew, 2002) . Some theoretical models predict an increase in trading volume is likely to occur if an announcement increases investor disagreement (Kim and Verrecchia, 1991) . More generally, Beaver (1968) predicts an increase in trading volume if an announcement has information content. Based on Beaver (1968) and the empirical evidence relating to earnings announcements, we predict that all three types of impairments have information content, and hence abnormal trading volume will increase, but make no distinction among them concerning magnitude.
Conditional on there being an observed increase in trading volume for each type of impairment, we expect the market maker in a bank's stock to set a bid-ask spread conditional on the type of asset impairment. If a market maker observes an increase in volume, he may be concerned that insiders with private information may take advantage of the situation because they can more easily hide their transactions. The market maker therefore price protects by increasing bid-ask spread (Copeland and Galai, 1983; Krinsky and Lee, 1996) . In the case of loan loss and CDO impairments, the market maker has less cause to worry that the increase in trading volume reflects trades by insiders with private information because these events are unlikely to have implications for future cash flows beyond that implied by the announcement itself. In contrast, increases in trading volume associated with retained interest impairments create the additional concern that insiders (including bank managers) are trading to take advantage of the information they have about actions the bank will take regarding whether and the extent to which the bank will absorb the losses of its SPEs. Thus, although we predict bidask spreads will increase for all three impairments, we predict the effect on spreads will be larger for retained interest impairments than for CDO and loan impairments.
Although an increase in trading volume does not necessarily imply there will be a directional price effect on bank stock prices, an increase in bid-ask spreads generally does. In particular, other things being equal, an increase in spreads suggest stock prices should fall when an impairment is announced as the increase in spread implies an increase in the cost of capital.
We predict the negative stock price reaction to be greatest for retained interest impairments because we expect spreads to increase more for such impairments. However, other things may not be equal-in particular, there may also be a change in investor expectations regarding future cash flows as well as a change in risk. For example, in the case of loan losses, it is possible for an announcement to convey "good news" to the market in that it signals that management is finally taking steps to minimize future loan losses. On the other hand, a loan loss provision could be bad news if it was larger than expected. 10 Thus, although we predict negative price reactions for impairments-particularly retained interest impairments-the possibility remains that the difficulty in capturing changes in investor expectations makes return predictions problematic.
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The fourth effect we consider is stock price volatility implied in call option prices. Prior research indicates that if a firm announcement can be anticipated, e.g., as is the case in most earnings announcements, implied equity volatility decreases following the announcement, as investor uncertainty is resolved Wolfson, 1979 and 1981) . However, if the announcement is not anticipated, e.g., there is an exogenous shock, investor uncertainty is likely to increase with such an announcement. 8-K disclosures are typically anticipated as most involve earnings announcements and firms typically schedule press conferences a few days in advance of 8-K filings. Therefore, for a typical 8-K filing in which earnings are announced, we predict implied volatility will increase before the announcement and fall on the day of the announcement, as uncertainty is resolved. However, we expect retained interest impairments to create rather than resolve uncertainty as investors become uncertain about what actions management will take regarding honoring implicit guarantees granted to SPE creditors.
Therefore, we predict implied volatility to increase when retained interest writedowns are announced. In contrast, it is difficult to predict whether implied volatility is expected to change 10 Although, in principle, it may be possible to develop a model of expectations, such a model would have to consider not only the information related to a specific bank but also any information transfer from other banks. 11 Return predictions are also complicated by the possible confounding effects of strategic impairment disclosure. That is, it is entirely possible that banks may time writedown events and magnitudes to influence investor expectations. However, because of the difficulty in modeling strategic disclosure, our predictions exclude such effects.
with announcements of loan losses or writedowns of CDOs. For example, in the case of CDO writedowns, investors may not have been surprised by the news because news about the drop in CDO prices generally was available to investors. Loan loss writedowns might even be expected to reduce investor uncertainty.
Empirical Design
Our basic estimating equation is similar for studying the announcement effects on bank stock returns, bank stock price bid-ask spreads, stock price volatility implied in option prices of bank equities, and bank equity trading volume. In particular, we begin by estimating the following cross-sectional regression:
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(1)
DEP_VAR is either daily stock return, 13 RETURN, daily bid-ask spread, SPREAD, daily implied volatility, IMPVOL, or daily abnormal trading volume, AVOLUME. LOAN_LOSS, RET_INTEREST, and ABS_CDO are indicator variables that take on a value of one if a bank, i, announces a "large" loan loss provision, retained interest writedown, or asset backed security/CDO writedown on day t, and zero otherwise. We estimate equation (1) using daily data for all sample banks during the sample period comprising the Fiscal Crisis (see data section below for details).
We do not consider the magnitude of the loan loss provision, retained interest and CDO writedowns because of the inherent difficulty associated with determining investor expectations for each variable. For example, investors might fully anticipate a large loan loss provision for one bank, but completely fail to anticipate a small writedown by another bank. Whereas in the case of the former bank, the market reaction would be expected to be small, in the case of the 12 For the sake of parsimony, we use the same notation for coefficients and regression errors for each of the four equations implied by equation (1). In all likelihood they differ. 13 Untabulated findings based on excess stock returns yield inferences identical to those reported in section 6 below.
latter bank the reaction could be large. Moreover, in the case of the retained interest writedowns, as noted above we do not expect there to be any obvious relation between the magnitude of retained interests and the value of implicit guarantees. Indeed, because retained interests are costly they comprise only a small fraction of bank assets. In principle, using indicator variables results in a loss of information. However, this is unlikely to be the case for retained interests, as the shape of the function relating retained interests to the value of implicit guarantees is unobservable. Taking into account these considerations, we therefore make the weaker prediction that the market reaction is related to the incidence but not the size of each writedown or provisioning event.
14 Based on predictions in section 3, we predict the following for the regression coefficients:
• AVOLUME:α 1 > 0; α 2 > 0; α 3 > 0;
• SPREAD: α 2 > α 1 > 0; α 2 > α 3 > 0;
• RETURN: α 2 < 0; α 1 >, <, or = 0; α 3 >, <, or = 0;
• IMPVOL: α 1 >, <, or = 0; α 2 ≥ 0; α 3 >, <, or = 0;
Prior literature (Krinsky and Lee, 1996; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000) indicates that bidask spreads depend on the firm's information environment, bank size, trading volume, and the volatility of the bank's returns. Failure to control for these factors could result in correlated omitted variable bias. As a result, when SPREAD is the dependent variable, we estimate a second model, given as equation (2), which includes proxy variables to control for the firm's information environment and other factors known to affect bid-ask spreads:
14 Another concern with including the magnitude of each impairment in the estimating equations arises from the fact that observations are measured daily. As a result, each impairment variable would be ill-behaved for purposes of drawing statistical inferences on the regression coefficients. In addition, because not all 8-Ks include information regarding impairment magnitudes, the sample size of event days would be reduced.
For each sample observation, LATQ is total assets measured as of the beginning of the calendar quarter, LMVOLUMEQ is the natural log of mean daily trading volume during the calendar quarter, and STDRET is the standard deviation of daily stock return during the calendar quarter.
Based on prior literature, larger banks with higher volume are predicted to have lower bid-ask spreads ) 0 ( 5 < α , while banks with higher return volatility are expected to have higher bid-ask spreads ) 0 ( 6 > α . Theoretical guidance for the potential impact of the firm's information environment on the other three dependent variables, RETURN, IMPVOL, and AVOLUME, is sparse. However, because information environment as reflected in LATQ, LMVOLUMEQ, and STDRET might also create correlated omitted variable bias in the RETURN, IMPVOL, and AVOLUME equations, we also estimate equation (2) for these three dependent variables.
Finally, because announcements of impairments and loan losses often coincide with earnings announcements, we extend equation (2) by including an indicator variable, EADUM, that takes on a value of one if firm earnings are announced on day t, and zero otherwise:
Based on prior research, we predict α 7 > 0 for each dependent variable. 
Sample and Data
For the purpose of our analysis, we identify the largest 100 financial institutions in the We retrieve quarterly accounting information for sample firms from the Compustat Fundamentals quarterly database. For each sample firm, we obtain the dates on which they announced their quarterly earnings and their total assets at the end of every quarter (ATQ). We also create an indicator variable (EADUM) for the day earnings were announced. The quarterly accounting information is merged with every daily observation in the three months that preceded the end of the quarter date.
We obtain the implied volatility data (IMPVOL) for our analysis from the OptionMetrics EVENT is a composite indicator variable constructed from the three event variables such that it takes the value of one if one or more of LOAN_LOSS, RET_INTEREST, and ABS_CDO is equal to one, and zero otherwise. We include EVENT to provide a descriptive measure of the incidence of writedowns. Panel B shows that on the event days, i.e., when EVENT equals one, whereas a loan loss occurred 79% of the time, a writedown of retained interests occurred on only 7% of occasions. Untabulated statistics also reveal that retained interest writedowns tend to be substantially smaller in magnitude than either CDO writedowns or loan loss provisions. For example, on days for which both retained interest writedowns and loan loss provisions were announced, the mean amounts for each are $1.57 billion and $0.29 billion. As a fraction of total assets, these amounts are 0.86% and 0.21%.
[Insert To gain a better understanding of the extent to which our sample firms are active players in the securitization market, we reviewed the 2007 annual reports of the firms in our sample and identified 37 financial institutions which have retained interests or managed assets disclosed. institutions. It is possible that other banks had retained interest writedowns but these impairments do not have a material impact on earnings and hence were not separately disclosed. Table 3 presents regression summary statistics associated with estimation of equations (1), (2), and (3) Table 4 presents regression summary statistics associated with estimation of equations (1), (2), and (3) using SPREAD as the dependent variable. The equation (1) findings indicate that the coefficients on each of the announcement indicator variables, is significantly positive.
Empirical Results
AVOLUME Estimations
SPREAD Estimations
The "large" loan loss, retained interest, and CDO writedown announcements, α 1 , α 2 and α 3 -0.027, 0.052, and 0.017-indicate that on average, spreads increase widely with each announcement, relative to the non-announcement spread of 0.069, i.e., α 0 . In addition, the findings also are consistent with the prediction that the largest increase in spread is for retained interest writedown announcements, which is approximately double and triple the increase for "large" loan loss and CDO writedowns. Untabulated t-statistics indicate that in 5 of 6 possible cases,α 2 > α 1 and α 2 > α 3 at less than the 7% level. 18 The exception is for the comparison of the retained interest writedown and loan loss coefficients in equation (2). However, the difference becomes significant once EADUM is included in equation (3). 19 Thus, despite the fact the retained interest writedowns represent a small fraction of total assets or small fraction of total writedowns, the effect on spreads is, as predicted, more pronounced than for other asset writedowns because such writedowns make the market maker concerned about the private information regarding the banks' future cash flow risk held by informed investors.
The findings from equation (2), in which control variables are included, and equation (3), which also includes EADUM, also indicate that, on average, spreads generally increase significantly with each announcement. For equation (2) (equation (3)), the "large" loan loss, retained interest, and CDO writedown announcement coefficients, α 1 , α 2 and α 3 , are 0.029, 0.042, and 0.015 (0.012, 0.032, and 0.009), with only α 3 being insignificantly positive in equation (3). In addition, the equations (2) and (3) findings also are consistent with our predictions that the largest increase in spread is for retained interest writedown announcements, although the control variables, not surprisingly, decrease coefficient magnitudes.
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18 t-statistics can be obtained by taking the square-root of an F-statistic when the denominator of the F-ratio has one degree of freedom. 19 Using standard errors based on clustering by firm leaves inferences unchanged for the retained interest and CDO writedown coefficient comparisons, but the difference between the retained interest and loan loss coefficients becomes insignificant. It is not surprising that clustered standard errors reduce significance levels, especially when there are a small number of clusters. In addition, simulation findings in Lahiri and Li (2009) suggest that F-statistics based on samples with small number of clusters can be problematic. 20 Untabulated findings from estimations in which we consider whether market reactions vary by quarter suggest that the increase in SPREAD associated with retained interest writedowns is concentrated in the first three quarters. However, because there are few writedowns in later quarters, it is difficult to determine whether this result is indicative of investors "learning" over time or lack of power. We also estimated equations (1) through (3) including industry fixed effects for different categories of banks, e.g., commercial banks, savings institutions, and security brokers. Untabulated findings indicate a significant increase in SPREAD when industry fixed effects are included.
[Insert table 4 here] Table 5 presents regression summary statistics associated with estimation of equations (1), (2), and (3) using RETURN as the dependent variable. Contrary to predictions, results in all specifications indicate no significant effect on stock return from retained interest impairment announcements, i.e., α 2 , is insignificantly different from zero. The findings indicate that only the coefficient on the "large" loan loss provisionα 1 , is significantly different from zero in any of the specifications. It is significantly positive, 0.015, in equation (1), in which no control variables are included, and in equation (2), when controls are included. This finding indicates that announcement of "large" loan loss provisions has an incremental effect of increasing stock return, on average, by 1.5%. However, when earnings announcements are considered, as is the case in equation (3), which also includes EADUM, α 1 becomes insignificantly different from zero. The coefficient on EADUM, α 7 , is significantly positive, 0.011, indicating that on average earnings announcement news is apparently positive on days that earnings is announced. The results in all specifications also indicate no significant effect on stock return from CDO impairment announcements, i.e., α 3 is insignificantly different from zero. Taken together, the findings in table 5 are consistent with the mean effect of impairments on stock prices being zero.
RETURN Estimations
[Insert table 5 here] Table 6 presents regression summary statistics associated with estimation of equations (1), (2), and (3) using IMPVOL as the dependent variable. Findings from equation (1), in which no control variables are included, indicate that the only significant coefficient is that on retained interest writedowns, with α 2 = 0.106. Thus, relative to a non-announcement day, for which implied volatility is 0.529 (α 0 ), implied volatility increases approximately 20% when retained interest writedowns are announced (0.106/0.529). These findings indicate that, consistent with predictions, retained interest writedowns increase investor uncertainty on the days they are announced.
IMPVOL Estimations
Inclusion of control variables in equations (2) and (3) continue to show a significant increase in implied volatility when retained interest writedowns are announced, with α 2 = 0.094 and 0.096. However, inclusion of controls also results in the "large" loan loss provision announcement coefficient becoming significantly negative, −0.043 and −0.041 in equations (2) and (3). Thus, in contrast to retained interest writedowns, "large" loan loss provisions appear to reduce investor uncertainty rather than increase it. The findings across all three specifications indicate that CDO writedowns fail to have a significant effect on implied volatility.
[Insert table 6 here]
The Effects of Regulation on SPREAD
The findings in table 4 indicate that despite the fact the retained interest writedowns represent a small fraction of total assets or small fraction of total writedowns, the effect on spreads is more pronounced than for other asset writedowns. This finding is consistent with such writedowns making the market maker concerned about private information regarding the banks' future cash flow risk held by informed investors. Information asymmetry regarding the cash flow risk associated with retained interest writedowns is likely to be lower if regulatory limitations prevent a financial institution from absorbing losses incurred by SPEs. To determine whether this is the case we re-estimate equations (1) through (3) for SPREAD partitioning the sample into "regulated" and "unregulated" firms, and based on whether Tier 1 capital is above and below the sample median. For our purposes, we define "regulated" entities to be those that have a Tier 1 capital ratio available in either Compustat or the regulatory call reports dataset provide by the federal reserve bank of Chicago. Matching the call report dataset to our data is based on a link table provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. We predict that the more regulatory capital-constrained a financial institution, the less likely it is to honor implicit guarantees to SPE capital providers. Thus, we predict the retained interest SPREAD coefficient is greater for "unregulated" firms, and for firms with above the median amount of Tier 1 capital.
Untabulated findings indicate that whereas the retained interest coefficients for regulated banks are insignificantly different from zero, those for unregulated banks are significantly positive. Similarly, whereas the retained interest coefficients for the most capital-constrained banks-i.e., those with Tier 1 capital below the median-are insignificantly different from zero, those for the least capital-constrained banks are significantly positive.
The untabulated findings also reveal a substantial difference between the coefficient on loan loss provisions for regulated and unregulated banks. Although all loan loss coefficients are significantly positive, those for unregulated banks are at least five times larger in magnitude than those for regulated banks. In addition, the findings also reveal that for unregulated banks, the LOAN_LOSS coefficient is larger than that on RET_INTEREST. These findings suggest that for unregulated banks information asymmetry associated with loan writedowns is greater than that associated with retained interest writedowns. As noted in section 5, loan writedowns are not only more commonplace than writedowns of retained interests, but they also usually of much larger magnitude. As a result, loan losses are more likely to bring down a bank than would be an implicit guarantee to rescue a securitization vehicle. However, there are good reasons to expect that the market anticipated that the government would be more likely to bail out regulated banks than unregulated ones. The bounds on rational beliefs would therefore have been much narrower for regulated banks.
Information Transfer Effect of Citigroup Retained Interest Writedown on SPREAD
As noted in section 5, Citigroup is the largest originator of retained interest and managed assets in our sample. Citigroup announced an impairment of retained interest on October 16,
2008
. A retained interest impairment by the largest player in the securitization market may be significant enough to cause investors of other financial institutions to reassess their beliefs about the exposure to losses from off balance sheet assets and liabilities faced by these institutions.
This assessment may initiate the same mechanism that was described in section 3 and cause SPREAD to increase in all the banks in our sample. To examine this possibility we construct an indicator variable that takes the value of one on the day of Citigroup's retained interest impairment and zero otherwise. We estimate a version of equation (3) with SPREAD as the dependent variable and the newly constructed indicator variable as an additional explanatory variable. Untabulated findings indicate that the coefficient on this indicator is positive and significant which suggests that the information in Citigroup's announcement caused investors in other financial institutions to become similarly concerned that these institutions would become more likely to honor their implicit guarantees to SPE investors.
Summary and Concluding Remarks
In this study, we investigate equity market reactions to the announcement of impairments of retained interests arising from asset securitizations made by financial institutions during the Financial Crisis of [2007] [2008] . We hypothesize that retained interest impairments contain information about the value of the implicit guarantees that banks provide in securitization transactions. We use the market reaction to announcements of loan losses and writedowns of asset-backed securities purchased as investments as a benchmark to compare the market reaction to the retained interest writedowns. Although retained interest impairments are relatively small in magnitude, compared to these other writedowns, our hypothesis suggests that they reveal information that of exposure to a much larger loss associated with off-balance sheet assets and liabilities. We analyze announcement effects on trading volume, stock price bid-ask spreads, stock returns, and volatility implied in option prices of bank equities. We find evidence that each of the announcements has information content as indicated by an increase in trading volume.
This increase in trading volume is also accompanied by a predicted increase in bid-ask spreads.
However, the increase is greatest for announcements of retained interest writedowns, which is consistent with the market being concerned that implicit guarantees associated with assets retained from securitizations could expose banks to the risk of substantial future losses.
Although we predict the mean effect on bank share prices of each of the writedown announcements to be negative, particularly for retained interests, after a full set of controls is included, none of the announcements has a significant effect on stock returns. These findings likely arise from the difficulty in measuring how investors' expectations were changed as a result of such announcements.
Finally, we also predict and find that implied equity volatility increases with retained interest writedown announcements, which is consistent with such announcements increasing investor uncertainty. In contrast, consistent with loan losses reducing investor uncertainty, we predict and find the large loan loss announcements are associated with a decrease in implied volatility.
Findings from additional tests that focus on bid-ask spreads indicate that information asymmetry regarding the cash flow risk associated with retained interest writedowns is greater for unregulated financial institutions and for the financial institutions that are less capital constrained. These findings are consistent with our prediction that information asymmetry effects are likely to be lower if regulatory limitations prevent a financial institution from absorbing losses incurred by SPEs.
Taken together, our findings provide evidence that retained interest writedowns result in a large increase in investor uncertainty. The significant increase in spreads and implied volatility in particular suggest that investors became concerned that implicit guarantees associated with assets retained from securitizations could expose banks to the risk of substantial future losses far in excess of the recognized losses.
We provide evidence that is consistent with the existence and implications of implicit guarantees in securitization transactions. Our analysis on spreads focusing on the effects of regulation and capital constraints provides evidence on the costs that limit the ability of S-Os to honor implicit guarantees. Our evidence suggests that frictions caused by regulation and accounting standards, including SFAS 140, created alternative mechanisms for securitization contracting i.e., implicit guarantees. Although our findings complement those from prior research that the market views SPE assets and liabilities as assets and liabilities of the S-O, by focusing on the Financial Crisis, our analysis is done in a setting that is potentially more revealing of the underlying economics of the securitization transaction. 
